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When Big Brother Becomes “Big
Father”: Examining the Continued Use




The U.S. Constitution grants American citizens numerous
Due Process rights; but, historically, the Supreme Court declined
to extend these Due Process rights to children.  Initially, com-
mon-law courts treated child offenders over the age of seven in
the same manner as adult criminals.  At the start of the 20th cen-
tury, though, juvenile reformers assisted in creating unique juve-
nile courts that used the parens patriae doctrine and viewed
children as delinquent youths in need of judicial parental gui-
dance rather than punishment.  Later, starting in 1967, the Su-
preme Court released multiple opinions extending certain
constitutional Due Process rights to children in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings.
While most states have implemented these constitutional
rights into statutory and procedural law, the state of Michigan
still struggles to clearly delineate how its justice system views and
handles child offenders.  Although Michigan’s Juvenile Code
originated from a parens patriae standpoint, current Michigan ju-
venile court practices are inconsistent at best and completely
contrary at worst.  The conflict between viewing a child as a crim-
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inal and as a delinquent youth is evident in the striking differ-
ences between Michigan’s Juvenile Code and Michigan courts’
opinions.  This Comment examines Michigan’s Juvenile Code
and evaluates the Michigan courts’ lack of consistency in apply-
ing the Juvenile Code and in protecting children’s constitutional
rights.  This Comment will also highlight some pending changes
to Michigan’s Juvenile Code and will provide recommendations
for changes that would improve Michigan children’s access to
their Due Process protections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One September evening, 16-year-old high school junior Brock
climbed into his pickup truck to travel to his younger sister’s volley-
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ball game.1  While driving, Brock realized that his girlfriend, who
was driving the car in front of him, was the victim of harassment
from a third vehicle.2  The third driver began tailgating Brock’s girl-
friend and veered into oncoming traffic to make obscene gestures at
her.3  When Brock came to a passing zone, he passed the third vehi-
cle and pulled in behind his girlfriend to protect her from harass-
ment.4  The driver of the third vehicle then began harassing Brock
by pulling alongside him, by gesturing for him to pull over, by cus-
sing at him, and by following so closely that the driver’s front
bumper made contact with Brock’s rear bumper.5  Brock, fearful
for his safety, refused to pull over and continued driving.6
Suddenly, several police cars, with sirens blaring and lights
flashing, forced Brock to pull over.7  Confused, he did so.8  A police
officer walked up to Brock’s window, slapped the side of the vehi-
cle, and told Brock, “Get out of the truck.”9  When Brock stepped
out, the officer immediately put Brock in handcuffs and began ask-
ing what Brock had been drinking or smoking, insinuating that
Brock was driving under the influence.10
Brock attempted to protest his innocence but could not be-
cause the officer failed to disclose the probable cause for the stop.11
Meanwhile, the driver of the third vehicle walked up to the scene,
reeking of alcohol on both his person and his breath.12  Listening to
the conversations between this driver and the officers, Brock real-
1. Interview with Brock*, Michigan citizen, in Michigan (Dec. 29, 2018).  *At





6. Id. Brock, knowing that the area had a high crime rate and was well-
known for drug trafficking and violent crime, feared stopping on the side of the




10. Id.  Simultaneously, another officer yelled at Brock’s girlfriend, who had
pulled over and was trying to help Brock. Id.  The officer told her, “Shut up, get
back in your car, and drive away.” Id.  Although she wished to videotape on her
phone what was happening, the officers threatened to charge her with driving
while texting if she did so; deeply upset, she got back in her car and drove away.
Id.
11. Interview—Brock, supra note 1.  Though the officers had Brock’s license,
which showed his minor age, at no time did the officers make any reference to
Brock’s age or attempt to follow any juvenile-specific procedures. Id.
12. Id.  Brock never witnessed any officers performing sobriety tests on this
driver. Id.
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ized that the potentially intoxicated driver was an off-duty police
officer.13
The officers placed Brock in the back of a squad car and
searched his truck.14  Not finding anything, the officers demanded
that Brock take a breath test, and he complied.15  The breath test
result was negative, leading the officers to drive Brock to a nearby
hospital for a blood test.16  A nurse drew and tested two tubes of
blood, but that test was also negative for any substances; so the of-
ficers transported Brock to the police station, leaving him alone in a
room—still in handcuffs—while the officers filed a report.17
Several hours after Brock’s initial detainment, the officers be-
grudgingly agreed to call Brock’s parents, saying, “Yeah, I guess we
can do that.”18  The officer who made the call, however, told
Brock’s parents only that Brock was in an accident and that they
should come to the station.19  When Brock’s parents arrived, the
officers prevented them from talking to Brock, limiting their access
to observing him through a window.20
Eventually, the officers took Brock to the county juvenile facil-
ity, where he underwent a third drug test—again with a negative
result.21  Brock remained at the juvenile facility until his bail hear-
ing at 3 PM the following day.22  The officers never read Brock his
13. Id.  Brock later found out that this driver had called the police to initiate
the stop. Id.




17. Id.  Throughout the whole process, Brock remained restrained in hand-
cuffs. Id.
18. Id. Thankfully, Brock had memorized his father’s number; the officers
refused him access to his cell phone. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.  Even after Brock’s parents arrived, the officers continued to question
Brock and to deny him access to counsel and to his parents during these interroga-
tions. Id.
21. Interview—Brock, supra note 1.  At the time the officers took Brock to
the facility, he had not talked to his parents or an attorney. Id.
22. Id.  At Brock’s bail hearing, he still had not consulted an attorney or his
parents. Id. At the hearing, Brock discovered that the police officers had alleged
that Brock drove recklessly and had caused property damage by striking a parked
vehicle. Id.  Brock’s vehicle had no damage. Id.  Additionally, the officers falsely
stated that Brock refused to take the breath test, resulting in an immediate suspen-
sion of his driver’s license and a difficult process for its reinstatement. Id.  After
the bail hearing, Brock’s parents hired an attorney, and the court eventually dis-
missed the case based on the officers’ illegal actions which violated Brock’s basic
constitutional rights. Id.  The false allegations led to some harassment from school
administration at Brock’s private high school, and he left the school in the spring
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Miranda23 rights or an implied consent form for the breath test,
never provided probable cause for the initial stop, never obtained
warrants for any of the three drug tests, never permitted Brock ac-
cess to an attorney or to his parents, and never ensured that Brock
understood the process.24  Brock later admitted that, at the time of
his arrest, he was completely unaware that he had constitutional
rights throughout this process and that the officers were acting
illegally.25
Brock’s story is, sadly, not uncommon.  Children across the
United States, including those in Michigan, often find themselves
thrust into a complex legal system with very little guidance availa-
ble to them or to their parents.  Even worse, many of these children
are financially unable to obtain their own attorneys but fail to meet
their states’ required indigency standards to qualify for court-ap-
pointed attorneys.26
Although the Constitution protects many civil rights of U.S.
citizens27 and incorporates those rights to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,28 the extension of
those rights to one of the country’s most vulnerable populations—
children—did not begin until 1967.29  Even though the United
of his junior year. Id.  At the time of our interview, 18-year-old Brock was work-
ing full-time, was earning his GED, and was planning a graduation party. Id.
23. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that police
officers must inform detainees of certain constitutional rights, including the right
against self-incrimination and the right to counsel).
24. Interview—Brock, supra note 1.
25. Id.
26. See infra Part III.B.3.
27. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI (listing constitutionally-protected rights,
including the right to avoid double jeopardy, right against self-incrimination, right
to due process, right to speedy trial, right to trial by jury of peers, right to be
informed of charges, right to confront accusers, right to a defense, and right to
counsel).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); see, e.g., Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“[W]e hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a
federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (“We hold today that the Fifth Amendment’s excep-
tion from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgment by the States.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963) (“This noble ideal [fair trials before impartial tribunals in which
every defendant stands equal before the law] cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”); Pow-
ell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1933) (holding that the right to counsel in capital
cases is a due process right originating from the Fifth Amendment but applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
29. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36–57 (1967) (holding that children are enti-
tled to certain constitutional rights); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
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States has made significant improvements in the juvenile courts’
treatment of children, many states have yet to fully implement ap-
propriate procedures to protect children’s constitutional rights.30
This Comment describes the historical context of children’s
constitutional rights in the United States, starting with the common-
law era and following the progression of juvenile courts to the pre-
sent day.31  Additionally, this Comment analyzes Michigan’s Juve-
nile Code and juvenile courts and evaluates whether Michigan’s
laws and juvenile courtrooms actually preserve the constitutional
rights of Michigan children.32  Finally, this Comment recommends
actions that Michigan can take to ensure that its law enforcement
and juvenile courts preserve the constitutional rights of its
children.33
II. BACKGROUND
The history of juvenile justice in the United States separates
into three distinct eras:  the common-law era (pre-1899), the parens
patriae era (1899–1967), and the post-Gault era (1967–present).34
In the first 100 years of U.S. history, courts made no distinction
between child offenders and adult criminals, treating both in the
same manner.35  Reacting to this harsh treatment of children under
common law, juvenile reformers created separate juvenile courts
that operated with a parens patriae, or paternalistic, mentality.36
But the unanticipated negative effects of parens patriae eventually
led the U.S. Supreme Court to redirect juvenile courts’ focus to-
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (citations omitted) (“Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age
of majority.  Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and pos-
sess constitutional rights.”).
30. See generally infra Part II.B.2. (describing the Court’s constitutional rights
decisions and the states’ struggles with implementing those rights).
31. Infra Part II.  Note that this Comment’s discussion of juvenile courts is in
the context of juvenile delinquency proceedings and does not include a discussion
of juvenile dependency or abuse and neglect proceedings. See JUVENILE LAW
CENTER, “Glossary,” https://bit.ly/2nwJNry [https://perma.cc/W7GV-TDGR] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2019) (describing the distinction between an adjudication of delin-
quency and an adjudication of dependency).
32. Infra Parts III.A. and III.B.
33. Infra Part III.C.
34. See DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING xxi-xxx
(2004) [hereinafter TANENHAUS—JUVENILE JUSTICE].
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.2. (explaining and defining the parens patriae
doctrine).
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ward children’s inherent constitutional rights by issuing the
landmark opinion, In re Gault.37
A. Common Law Era (Pre-1899)
Before 1899, U.S. courts employed common-law principles in
dealing with children who had committed crimes.38  Common-law
principles used punishment as a form of deterrence rather than as a
means of rehabilitation.39  At common law, courts declined to hold
children 7-years-old and younger liable for any criminal actions,
and some states extended that age to 12-years-old if the child
lacked mental capacity.40
Courts processed child offenders over seven in the same man-
ner as adult criminals.41  The common-law courts employed a
straightforward procedure:  “[t]he child was arrested, put into
prison, indicted by the grand jury, tried by a petit jury, under all the
forms and technicalities of our criminal [common] law . . . .”42  The
courts’ procedural intent was to determine whether the child had
committed the criminal act and, if so, what consequences the law
required.43
The use of common-law procedure in prosecuting children
caused significant problems because courts meted out consequences
to children based solely on what the law required (not on each
child’s particular circumstances), causing children to languish in
adult prisons and often resulting in children’s future recidivism in-
stead of rehabilitation.44
B. Parens Patriae Era (1899–1967)
As the 20th Century approached, many social reformers be-
came concerned with the courts’ treatment of children and began
advocating for a procedural distinction between child offenders and
37. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
38. TANENHAUS—JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 34, at xxi–xxx.
39. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909)
[hereinafter Mack—Juvenile Court] (“The fundamental thought in our criminal ju-
risprudence was not, and in most jurisdictions is not, reformation of the criminal,
but punishment; punishment as expiation for the wrong, punishment as a warning
to other possible wrongdoers.”).
40. Id.
41. Julian W. Mack, The Chancery Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in THE
CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT 310, 310 (1925).
42. Mack—Juvenile Court, supra note 39, at 106.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 106–07.
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adult criminals.45  By 1899, these juvenile reformers’ efforts led to
the second era of juvenile justice in the United States.46
1. Juvenile Reform Movement
Two Chicago women, Lucy Flower and Julia Lathrop, started
the movement that eventually spurred national change in juvenile
justice policy.47  Lucy Flower was a wealthy philanthropist and so-
cial reformer who mentored the younger Julia Lathrop; together,
they lobbied the Illinois government to consider creating separate
juvenile courts.48  Julia Lathrop later suggested that juvenile courts
could reduce the number of child offenders by providing services to
strengthen and support families’ ability to better care for and super-
vise their children.49
In 1899, the efforts and rhetoric of Lathrop and Flowers paid
off when Cook County, Illinois, created a juvenile court—the first
such institution in the United States.50  This new juvenile court fo-
cused on informality in all hearings by implementing policies
prohibiting any formal hearing records or transcripts and by permit-
ting only those involved in the case to enter the courtroom.51  Juve-
nile courts no longer called children “criminals” but rather
“delinquents” in an effort to remove some of the negative stigmati-
zation surrounding child offenders.52  Delinquents were not only
juveniles who committed criminal acts but also juveniles who exhib-
45. See id. at 107.  These reformers specifically called for courts to focus on
the importance of addressing each child’s unique circumstances and on improving
each child’s life. Id.  Juvenile reformers regularly criticized the common-law
courts, asking:
Why is it not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy
or a girl has committed a specific offense, to find out what he is, physi-
cally, mentally, morally, and then if it learns that he is treading the path
that leads to criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to punish as
to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to
make him a criminal but a worthy citizen.
Id.
46. See id.
47. TANENHAUS—JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 3.
48. Id. at 3–5.
49. Julia C. Lathrop, The Background of the Juvenile Court in Illinois, in THE
CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 290, 295–96 (1925) (“[T]he social forces
which can really lessen the number of children who appear before the juvenile
court are creative and not repressive forces.  Good and intelligent parents, homes
of decent comfort and a community which consciously protects public health, rec-
reation and education are true guarantees of normal childhood.”).
50. MARY J. CLEMENT, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: LAW AND PROCESS
16 (2d ed. 2002).
51. See id. at 19.
52. See id. at 73 (defining “delinquent” as a juvenile “who has committed an
act for which he or she could be arrested if he or she were an adult”).
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ited “antisocial behavior,” a vague term describing a broad range of
socially abnormal behaviors.53
2. Parens Patriae Doctrine
Juvenile reformers based their movement on the parens patriae
doctrine, which espouses the belief that government has the power
to act on behalf of vulnerable citizens, especially children.54  In ju-
venile courts, parens patriae became “the power of the state
through the court to act in behalf of the child as a wise parent
would.”55
Some juvenile reformers argued that the “breakdown of the
home”—through divorce and single parenting—was a major factor
causing children to act in a delinquent manner.56  The alleged lack
of “stable parenting” was one justification for the juvenile court’s
acting in a parent’s place.57  The original juvenile court served not
to convict children but rather to evaluate their circumstances and to
determine what was in the best interest of both the children and the
government, often resulting in the courts’ removing children from
both their homes and the authority of “unfit” parents.58
53. See id. at 75.  These “antisocial behaviors” were noncriminal behaviors
such as “wanders streets at night,” “sleeps in alleys,” “attempts to marry without
consent,” and “given to sexual irregularities.” See id. at 74–75 (listing 34 activities
that courts considered “delinquent” behavior). See also, e.g., Sheila O’Connor,
When ‘Incorrigible’ Teen Girls Were Jailed, N.Y. TIMES (NOV. 14, 2019), https://
nyti.ms/2OuNoQz [https://perma.cc/845W-FPHY] (detailing the story of the au-
thor’s grandmother whom the juvenile court placed into a detention facility for the
offense of “incorrigibility” because the girl was unmarried, underage, and
pregnant).
54. See Mack—Juvenile Court, supra note 39, at 108–09; see also Parens Pa-
triae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining parens patriae as the
concept that governments have the role of “provider of protection to those unable
to care for themselves”).
55. ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY & NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, GUIDES FOR JU-
VENILE COURT JUDGES 1 (Marjorie Bell Ed., 2d ed. 1963).
56. See Miriam Van Waters, The Juvenile Court from the Child’s Viewpoint: A
Glimpse into the Future, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 217, 219–22
(1925) (arguing that courts implemented parens patriae when “parenthood itself
began to weaken, so that not only were thousands of children brought before the
court who in happier conditions would never have come, but the children them-
selves had no conception of what a wise, good father and mother ought to be”).
57. Id. at 218.  An allegation of unstable parenting gave the juvenile judge the
role of evaluating the child’s previous parental involvement and of deciding if the
child suffered from a lack of “the fundamental rights of childhood to parental shel-
ter, guidance, and control.” Id.
58. See Mack—Juvenile Court, supra note 39, at 109, 119–20 (explaining that
the juvenile court steps in “to have the state intervene between the natural parent
and the child because the child needs it, as evidenced by some of its acts, and
because the parent is either unwilling or unable to train the child properly”).
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Juvenile court judges learned to “[i]ndividualize the child,” to
“[h]ave an awareness of how the child views himself,” to “[w]eigh
the past in terms of the future,” to avoid tying their “own hands
with clichés,” and to “[d]etermine the type and quality of treatment
services available and select what is needed.”59  Juvenile reformers
intended parens patriae to emphasize each child’s individuality in
juvenile courts and to communicate to each child that the juvenile
judge would ensure that the child received the opportunity to over-
come any previously bad behaviors and to become a model
citizen.60
The juvenile reformers intended their rehabilitative focus to
remove the criminal stigmatizations that had plagued children in
the common-law courts and had caused high levels of recidivism.61
The juvenile judge knew his role as a father-figure was to provide
“kindly assistance” in a warm, welcoming atmosphere; to encourage
children to speak honestly of their actions; and to “train the child
right” in the absence of appropriate parents.62
3. Parens Patriae Problems
Although the juvenile court founders had noble intentions and
meticulous plans, the implementation of their ideas demonstrated
some fundamental flaws in the parens patriae doctrine, mainly in
the areas of constitutional rights and legal representation.63  Juve-
nile reformers insisted that, in direct opposition to the common-law
courts, the juvenile courts were a social, scientific institution with
little basis in actual legal theory and with the purpose of improving
children’s lives rather than enforcing laws.64  Juvenile courts drew
from contemporary social science rather than from legal precedents
in their disposition of cases.65  Because juvenile reformers did not
59. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 71–82.
60. See Van Waters, supra note 56, at 235 (“Our chief goal should be the es-
tablishment of personal relationships with the child.  We must grasp him with heart
and mind, vividly and clearly, as our own flesh and blood in distress.”); Mack—
Juvenile Court, supra note 39, at 120 (“The child who must be brought into court
should . . . be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.”).
61. See Mack—Juvenile Court, supra note 39, at 109; ADVISORY COUNCIL,
supra note 55, at 3.
62. Mack—Juvenile Court, supra note 39, at 117, 120.
63. See ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 65, 79.
64. See Nils Anderson, Trial by Newspaper, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND
THE COURT 108, 116–17 (1925).
65. See generally A.L. Jacoby, “When a Feller Needs a Friend”: The Adoles-
cent Delinquent, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 5, 12 (1925) (explain-
ing the juvenile court theory that children’s bad behavior is caused by “the power
of the sex urge” and “the absence of inhibitions and the impulsiveness of this pe-
riod of life”).
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view the juvenile court as a criminal institution, the juvenile court
philosophy was that children did not have constitutional rights in
this setting because the judge’s role was to act in children’s best
interests and not necessarily as an arbiter of justice.66
As the ultimate decision-maker in the juvenile courts, the juve-
nile judges acted in whatever manner they deemed best for the
child, regardless of the potential violation of constitutional rights.67
Juvenile judges’ broad discretion led to a de-emphasis of the impor-
tance of legal counsel in juvenile proceedings; the role of most at-
torneys involved in juvenile courts was only to convince children to
admit their “delinquent behavior” and to assist the court in imple-
menting appropriate consequences.68  Because “the principles and
philosophy of the [juvenile] court are intended to protect the rights
of the child,” very few lawyers actually found themselves represent-
ing children in the juvenile courts.69
Ultimately, these constitutional issues led legal professionals to
question whether the juvenile reformers’ various social theories
could be fully implemented in practice and whether those theories
that were in effect were actually protecting children.70
66. Mack—Juvenile Court, supra note 39, at 109–14 (citing language from nu-
merous state supreme court opinions that dismissed claims alleging a need for con-
stitutional rights and that instead reasserted the juvenile court’s role as “the
legitimate guardian and protector of children”).  One state judge used very strong
language to assert his belief that constitutional rights have no place in juvenile
courts:
It would be carrying the protection of “inalienable rights,” guaranteed by
the Constitution, a long ways to say that that guaranty extends to a free
and unlimited exercise of the whims, caprices, or proclivities of either a
child or its parents or guardians for idleness, ignorance, crime, indigence,
or any kindred dispositions or inclinations.
Id. at 111 (quoting Ex parte Sharpe, 96 P. 563, 565 (Idaho 1908)).
67. See ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 79 (“The child and his parents
may consider commitment to be ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment, but the judge
must be guided by his conviction of what will ultimately be best for the child.”).
68. Daniel L. Skoler, The Right to Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Juvenile
Court Proceedings, 43 IND. L. J. 558, 579–81 (1968).
69. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 65 (mentioning parents’ right to
hire their child an attorney but failing to address children’s own right to an
attorney).
70. See Mack—Juvenile Court, supra note 39, at 114 (demonstrating one of
the idealistic but impractical theories by advocating the creation of rurally-located
facilities “laid out on the cottage plan” that feature couples caring for the delin-
quent children in a way that provides “fresh air and contact with the soil” and
supplants “locks and bars and other indicia of prisons” with “human love,”
“human interest,” and “vigilance”).
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C. Setting the Stage for Gault (1960s)
1. “The Worst of Both Worlds”
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court began to grant certiorari to
juvenile justice cases to attempt to clarify some of these constitu-
tional questions.  However, before the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision In re Gault, the Court first examined juvenile justice issues
in Kent v. United States.71
Morris Kent, Jr., an African-American child, was 14-years-old
in 1959 when he appeared before the juvenile court in the District
of Columbia.72  Three years later, in 1961, police officers detained
Morris on suspicion of breaking into a woman’s apartment, robbing
her, and raping her; he was 16 at the time.73  The police questioned
Morris for seven hours; and, though Morris eventually confessed,
the police continued questioning him the next day.74  Four days af-
ter the police took Morris into custody, his mother obtained an at-
torney for him.75  Despite the defense attorney’s objections and
provision of documentation proving Morris’s mental illness, the po-
lice detained Morris for nearly a week without a hearing until a
juvenile judge ultimately ordered the jurisdictional waiver of Mor-
ris’s case to adult criminal court.76
Morris appealed the jurisdictional waiver in multiple courts;
but, while the appeals were proceeding, a jury found Morris “not
guilty [of the rape charge] by reason of insanity.”77  The trial court
sent Morris to a mental institution; and, after his mental treatment,
Morris received a sentence of 30–90 years for his conviction on the
remaining charges.78  Morris continued the appeals, maintaining
that the manner of his arrest and questioning violated his constitu-
tional rights.79
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually held that the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional waiver was improper, stating that juvenile
71. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
72. See DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
54–56 (2011) [hereinafter TANENHAUS—CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS]; see also Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966) (explaining that Morris’s first encounter
with the juvenile court was on charges of breaking and entering and stealing a
purse, which resulted in the court’s placing Morris on probation and sending him
back to his mother).
73. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543.
74. Id. at 543–44.
75. Id. at 544.
76. Id. at 545–46.
77. Id. at 549–50.
78. Id. at 550.
79. Id. at 551.
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courts do not have “a license for arbitrary procedure” and that “the
admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship [parens patriae]
is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.”80  The Court also
highlighted growing concerns about the effectiveness of juvenile
courts in practice.81  The Court observed that “the child receives
the worst of both worlds” but declined to consider the overall ques-
tion of whether constitutional rights exist in delinquency
proceedings.82
Throughout his appeals, Morris remained in the mental institu-
tion to which the trial court had committed him at the start of the
case in 1961.83  When the Supreme Court’s final decision over-
turned the trial court disposition in 1968, Morris was able to leave
the mental institution and to pursue a normal life, marrying and
having children while avoiding any new criminal involvement.84
Although the Court did not definitively rule on children’s con-
stitutional rights, the Kent case is important for being the first to
look at the national use of parens patriae in juvenile courts and for
demonstrating that even the Supreme Court was aware of chil-
dren’s potential need for constitutional protection.85
2. Challenging the “Grossly Overoptimistic View”
In February 1967, the national discussion on juvenile justice
methods continued with a report by The President’s Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.86  The report fea-
tured an entire chapter entitled “Juvenile Delinquency and Youth
Crime.”87  The Commission emphasized the importance of elimi-
nating the high rates of juvenile recidivism that were overflowing
into adulthood and that constituted a large portion of all criminal
80. Id. at 552–55.
81. See id. at 555 (“[S]tudies and critiques in recent years raise serious ques-
tions as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical
purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of constitu-
tional guaranties applicable to adults.”).
82. Id. at 556.
83. ALIDA V. MERLO & PETER J. BENEKOS, REAFFIRMING JUVENILE JUS-
TICE: FROM Gault to Montgomery 10 (2017).
84. Id.
85. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 555–56 (“There is evidence, in fact, that there may
be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regener-
ative treatment postulated for children.”).
86. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967), https://bit.ly/2SaPSDB [https://
perma.cc/2KFA-XUTX].
87. See id. at 55–89.
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activity.88  The Commission suggested that the best way to lower
crime rates was “by ameliorating the conditions of life that drive
people to commit crimes and that undermine the restraining rules
and institutions erected by society against antisocial conduct.”89
Investigating the juvenile court system, the Commission ex-
pressed disappointment that “the great hopes originally held for the
juvenile court have not been fulfilled” and that the high recidivism
rates among children reflected this failure to meet the juvenile
court’s goal of rehabilitation (rather than incarceration).90  The
Commission primarily blamed the troubles of the juvenile court on
the lack of appropriately qualified juvenile judges.91  Overall, the
Commission reported that the juvenile courts never implemented
the juvenile reformers’ idealistic intentions in practice due to a
dearth of available qualified staff and to an inability to rehabilitate
in the desired manner.92  The Commission went so far as to claim
that the very scientific and social philosophies that were the juve-
nile court’s foundation originated from flawed understandings of
the causes of delinquency.93
The Commission found that the juvenile court had adopted
many formal, criminal court characteristics in conflict with its in-
tended informal, parens patriae-based setting.94  The Commission
strongly recommended that the states restrict the jurisdiction of the
juvenile courts and apply “basic principles of due process” to juve-
nile proceedings.95  The Commission cited Kent as an example of
how discontent with the juvenile courts had prompted a national
discussion and acknowledged that Gault, then before the Supreme
Court, could considerably change the juvenile court process.96  The
88. Id. at 55.
89. Id. at 58.
90. Id. at 80.
91. See id. (“A recent study of juvenile court judges in the United States re-
vealed that half had no undergraduate degree; a fifth had received no college edu-
cation at all; a fifth were not members of the bar.”).
92. See id. (using the phrase “grossly overoptimistic view” to describe the
original intentions for the juvenile court procedure and results).
93. See id. (“What research is making increasingly clear is that delinquency is
not so much an act of individual deviancy as a pattern of behavior produced by a
multitude of pervasive societal influences well beyond the reach of the actions of
any judge, probation officer, correctional counselor, or psychiatrist.”).
94. Id. at 81.  At this point, the legal community had not acknowledged this
procedural and substantive change in the juvenile courts. Id.  The significance of
this unacknowledged change was that children were once again receiving criminal
treatment without the same constitutional protections that adult criminals re-
ceived. Id.
95. See id. (“Counsel and evidentiary restrictions are among the essential ele-
ments of fundamental fairness in juveniles as well as adult criminal courts.”).
96. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra note 86, at 85–86.
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Commission concluded that all of these changes meant that chil-
dren should receive greater access to counsel in juvenile
proceedings.97
D. Constitutional Era (1967–present)
Just over a year after the Kent decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court once more ruled on a juvenile constitutional issue in the
Gault case.98  The Gault decision ushered in an era of Supreme
Court opinions on the constitutional rights of children, an era that
has continued into the 21st century.99
1. Ending “Kangaroo Courts”100
On June 8, 1964, Gerald (“Jerry”) Gault, a 15-year-old resident
of a small town in Arizona, was home alone, enjoying summer
break, when a police officer knocked on his door and took him into
custody.101  The police officer accused Jerry and his friend Ronnie
of making a sexually suggestive, inappropriate phone call to a
woman whose only report of the incident was a phone call to the
officer.102
When the police officer carted Jerry away from his home and
to the county “drunk tank,” neither of Jerry’s parents were home;
moreover, the officer failed to contact or to notify the Gaults that
their son was in police custody.103  When Mrs. Gault finally found
out where her son was, she went to visit him and to find out what
was happening; but an officer at the jail prevented her from seeing
Jerry and informed her that a hearing would occur the next day.104
The juvenile court did not prepare a transcript of that hearing;
and every individual present remembered the facts differently,
97. See id. at 86 (“And in all cases children need advocates to speak for them
and guard their interests.”).
98. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
99. See MERLO, supra note 83, at 49–70.
100. A “kangaroo court” is “a self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which
the principles of law and justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied.”
Kangaroo Court, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  Usually, a kangaroo
court is a “sham legal proceeding.” Id.  While the origins of the term are
unknown, legal scholars assume that the word “kangaroo” is meant to “refer to the
illogical leaps between ‘facts’ and conclusions . . . .” Id.
101. See TANENHAUS—CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 28–30.
Jerry had previous encounters with law enforcement and the juvenile court system
during his young life due to some minor offenses but had so far avoided punish-
ment other than probation. Id. at 28.
102. Id. at 30–31.
103. Id. at 30–31.
104. Id.
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leading to a disagreement over whether Jerry actually confessed in
the hearing to making the phone call and comments.105  Later that
day, the officer sent Mrs. Gault a note informing her that the juve-
nile judge had scheduled another hearing in less than a week.106
Mr. and Mrs. Gault did not hire an attorney because their land-
lord—who was also the chief of police—claimed that the juvenile
judge “was giving the boy a year’s probation.”107
At the second hearing, the juvenile judge shocked the Gaults
by sentencing Jerry to a state juvenile facility for an indefinite
time—possibly until Jerry’s 21st birthday.108  Jerry went to a state
juvenile detention facility in Fort Grant, Arizona,109 and his parents
began looking for someone who could bring Jerry home.110  The
Gaults hired Amelia Lewis as their attorney, and she filed a habeas
corpus petition with the state superior court,111 resulting in a hear-
ing in which Lewis emphasized the lack of notice given to the
Gaults and the dearth of reasoning supporting the juvenile judge’s
decision.112  Despite Lewis’s efforts, the superior court judge de-
nied the habeas corpus petition, and Lewis appealed to the Arizona
Supreme Court, adding an allegation that Arizona’s juvenile court
law was unconstitutional.113
Unsurprisingly, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the supe-
rior court’s ruling,114 and Lewis proceeded to get assistance from
the local ACLU chapter in preparing an appeal to the U.S. Su-
105. Id. at 31.
106. Id. at 32.  At this point, Jerry remained in police custody. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at xv, 33 (describing how Mrs. Gault’s questioning the juvenile
judge about the continued absence of Jerry’s accuser from the proceedings may
have irritated him and caused his surprising sentence, his forbidding Mrs. Gault
from saying farewell to Jerry before being taken to the detention facility, and his
saying “she ought to be sent down to Fort Grant”).
109. Id.  The facility to which Jerry went, Fort Grant, had a long and tortured
history, earning itself the name of “desert devil’s island.” Id. at 23.  Soon after his
sentence began, Jerry experienced Fort Grant’s brutality when other juvenile de-
tainees raped a younger juvenile detainee who suffered from cerebral palsy. Id. at
33.  Shortly after the rape, the child victim committed suicide while still at Fort
Grant. Id.
110. Id. at 33.
111. See TANENHAUS—CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 33 (ex-
plaining that Arizona prohibited juveniles from appealing their delinquency adju-
dications which meant that habeas corpus was Jerry’s only recourse).
112. See id. at 36–37 (“Since the process was so informal and there was no
appellate review of juvenile court cases, Judge McGhee was not accustomed to
explaining his decision-making.  He had a difficult time, for example, articulating
how he applied the relevant laws or why he had sent Jerry to Fort Grant.”).
113. Id. at 39.
114. In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760 (Ariz. 1965).
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preme Court.115  On May 15, 1967, the Court issued its opinion in
Jerry’s case, beginning a new era of juvenile justice and extending
constitutional rights to children across America.116  The Court de-
termined that children have the following constitutional rights in
delinquency proceedings:  the due-process right to notice, the right
to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses.117
The Court started its analysis of Jerry’s case with a clarification
of what was at issue:  only “the proceedings by which a determina-
tion is made as to whether a juvenile is a ‘delinquent’ as a result of
alleged misconduct on his part . . . .”118  Additionally, the Court
spent a great deal of its opinion providing a background history on
the juvenile court, using language conveying the Court’s disap-
proval of the parens patriae doctrine’s effects on juvenile proceed-
ings.119  The Court emphasized the importance of due process in
juvenile court proceedings.120  The Court also cited both Kent and
the President’s Commission’s report in its decision regarding
whether children possess constitutional rights in juvenile court
proceedings.121
The Court expressed its displeasure at the lack of notice pro-
vided to Jerry and his parents and at the juvenile judge’s failure to
consider alternatives to sending Jerry to a state facility.122  The
Court restated its assertions from Kent that even juvenile proceed-
ings must adhere to “the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment.”123  The Court defined notice very differently from the lower
courts, stating that “[n]otice, to comply with due process require-
ments, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court pro-
115. TANENHAUS—CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 44–45.
116. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
117. Zawadi Baharanyi & Randy Hertz, The Many Stories of In re Gault, in
RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 6–10 (Kristin Henning, et al., eds., 2018).
118. Gault, 387 U.S. at 14.  These proceedings are otherwise known as “delin-
quency adjudication” hearings. Id.
119. See id. at 15–20 (using language such as “[parens patriae’s] meaning is
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance” and “the constitutional
and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is—to say the least—debatable”).
120. See id. at 20–21 (“Due process of law is the primary and indispensable
foundation of individual freedom.”).
121. Id. at 13–15.
122. Cf. id. at 28–29 (“Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy
does not justify a kangaroo court . . .” and “one would assume . . . the Juvenile
Judge would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the possibility that
the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home” and “safeguards available to
adults were discarded in Gerald’s case . . .”).
123. Id. at 30–31 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)); see
also Kent, 383 U.S. at 552–55.
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ceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded,
and it must ‘set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.’”124
The Court was emphatic that neither the probation officer nor
the juvenile judge could represent the interests of a child in juvenile
courts and strongly suggested that children need representation in
juvenile hearings.125  The Court first addressed a child’s right to
counsel and held:
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency
which may result in commitment to an institution in which the
juvenile’s freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be
notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel retained
by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will
be appointed to represent the child.126
Next, the Court evaluated a child’s right against self-incrimina-
tion and held that “the constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to
adults.”127  Finally, the Court considered a child’s right to confront
his or her accuser and held that, “absent a valid confession, a deter-
mination of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state in-
stitution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony
subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance
with our law and constitutional requirements.”128
Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturned Jerry’s delinquency
adjudication.129  By the time the Court made its decision in 1967,
17-year-old Jerry had already come home from Fort Grant, was
training to be a welder, and was eager to join the military.130  Jerry
eventually enlisted in the United States Army, served over twenty
124. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33 (quoting THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T
& ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 87 (1967)).
125. See id. at 36.  The Court emphasized children’s dependence on legal
assistance:
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law,
to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the pro-
ceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it.  The child “requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him.”
Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
126. Id. at 41.
127. Id. at 55.
128. Id. at 56–57.
129. Id. at 59.
130. See TANENHAUS—CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 91, 93
(describing how Amelia Lewis had to fight the state to clear Jerry’s record of the
adjudication since he could not join the army with such a conviction).
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years, and married and raised children and grandchildren, maintain-
ing his innocence his whole life.131  Jerry learned from his juvenile
delinquency experience, stating, “People in this society need to re-
alize that these children that we are putting behind bars, without
counsel, are our next leaders.”132
Meanwhile, nationwide, “[t]he Gault decision set the stage for
a reassessment of juvenile interventions under parens patriae.”133
Numerous cases came before the Supreme Court in the following
years, leading the Court to re-emphasize that “children are people”
while still maintaining the uniqueness of the juvenile courts.134
Young Jerry Gault could not have known that his case would be-
come a landmark federal decision establishing that at least some of
the rights enumerated in the Constitution apply to children as well
as to adults.135
2. Continuing the Trend
In the decades following the Gault decision, the Supreme
Court handed down numerous decisions that further delineated the
constitutional rights of children.  These holdings include:  children’s
convictions must meet a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt;136
children are not constitutionally entitled to receive a jury trial;137
trying a child in both juvenile court and adult criminal court for the
same offense constitutes a double-jeopardy violation;138 children
have a right to privacy in certain circumstances;139 children cannot
exercise their Miranda rights by requesting their probation officer
be present rather than a lawyer;140 children under the age of 18
131. Id. at 122–23.
132. Id. at 123.
133. MERLO, supra note 83, at 49.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 48–49.
136. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
137. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (reasoning, in part,
from a parens patriae standpoint and claiming that a jury trial could have the po-
tential to “remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process” by de-
stroying “the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding”).
138. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530–31 (1975).
139. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (holding that chil-
dren’s right to privacy in school is outweighed by “the substantial need of teachers
and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools”); Carey v. Popu-
lation Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (“[T]he right to privacy in connection
with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults.”);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74–75 (1976) (holding
that a pregnant minor’s right to privacy outweighs parental interest in that minor’s
ending a pregnancy).
140. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 722–24 (1979) (“[T]he probation
officer is not in a position to offer the type of legal assistance necessary to protect
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cannot receive a death sentence;141 children have a right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizures;142 children cannot be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment without parole;143 and children are in a
different constitutional and legal class than adults.144
Additionally, Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Act (JJDPA),145 which created the Office of Ju-
venile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)146 in 1974;
both actions stemmed from a desire to regulate juvenile delin-
quency and rehabilitation on a national level.147  The JJDPA sets
aside federal funding for OJJDP to provide to states for juvenile
delinquency prevention programs and rehabilitation services.148
In response to these landmark decisions and new legislation, a
considerable number of young lawyers began to enter public inter-
est fields, forming nonprofit organizations dedicated to protecting
children’s rights.149  While these new juvenile defenders had to con-
the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused undergoing custodial interrogation that
a lawyer can offer.”).
141. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 575 (2005) (emphasizing that the
United States was the last nation to officially sanction children to be executed and
holding that juvenile death sentences violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
142. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 376–77
(2009) (holding that a school official’s strip search of a student was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment).
143. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012); see also Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (holding that Miller must be applied retroac-
tively to anyone currently incarcerated for life without parole sentences from of-
fenses committed as juveniles and that states must either resentence those
convicted or consider those convicted for parole because children “must be given
the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption”).
144. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011) (“children are not
adults”).
145. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (JJDPA), Pub.
L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 34
U.S.C. (2018)).
146. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), https://
bit.ly/2NAukS1 [https://perma.cc/ZE6Q-8975] (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
147. MERLO, supra note 83, at 14.
148. Id. at 14–15.  In order to receive the money, states must meet several
standards:  “1. [r]educe disproportionate minority contact in the juvenile justice
system”; “2. [d]einstitutionalize status offenders”; “3. separate juveniles from
adults in secure facilities”; and “4. remove juveniles from adult jails and lockups.”
Id. at 15.  The difficulty arises when states choose to forego the funds so that they
do not have to meet the required standards. Id.
149. See, e.g., Robert Schwartz, Gault’s Ripple Effect: the Founding of Juve-
nile Law Center, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY
IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 99, 99–100 (Kristin Henning et al., eds., 2018)
(describing the formation of the Juvenile Law Center, which Temple Law School
graduates started in Philadelphia in 1975); Patricia Puritz, Building a National Ju-
venile Defense Community: the National Juvenile Defender Center, in RIGHTS,
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front the fundamental question of all lawyers—who is my client?—
and learn how to represent the wishes of children rather than solely
their best interests,150 the biggest difficulty facing children’s lawyers
was and still is the lack of any national or centralized databases for
juvenile justice statistics.151  The other main issue for juvenile attor-
neys is children’s lack of education regarding the rights they have
during detention, questioning, arrest, and delinquency proceed-
ings.152  Children’s lack of constitutional knowledge has resulted in
the abuse of children’s rights by corrupt juvenile judges and legal
officials, as the Kids for Cash scandal in Pennsylvania demon-
strated.153  Although the Supreme Court decided Gault more than
50 years ago, many states—especially Michigan—still fail to ensure
the protection of children’s guaranteed constitutional rights.
III. ANALYSIS
When the Supreme Court held in 2016 that the ban on sentenc-
ing children to life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) applies
retroactively to those currently serving such sentences (“juvenile lif-
ers”),154 most states implemented this holding by offering parole
consideration.  Two states, however, chose to resentence the juve-
RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 169, 174–76 (Kristin Henning et al., eds., 2018) (describing the formation
of the National Juvenile Defender Center (NJDC), which was founded to develop
a community amongst and provide a resource for juvenile defenders nationwide).
150. See Schwartz, supra note 149, at 103–06 (explaining how many juvenile
judges were not accustomed to having lawyers who represented a child’s wishes
and struggled to accept the practice in their courtrooms).
151. See DONALD J. SHOEMAKER, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 28–29 (3d ed.
2018) (detailing the lack of a national database for juvenile court statistics);
MERLO, supra note 83, at 12–13 (“states do not have a uniform system for provid-
ing counsel” and “procedures often vary county by county [and state by state]”).
152. See MERLO, supra note 83, at 55 (analyzing a survey that found that
merely ten percent of detained children exercised their right to counsel, which sug-
gests that most children do not “fully comprehend the language of the Miranda
warning,” are “unclear on what the right to counsel means” and are “mistaken in
their understanding of the right to remain silent”). See also supra notes 24–25 and
accompanying text.
153. See MERLO, supra note 83, at 56–57. The Kids for Cash scandal erupted
in 2009 when Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, removed juvenile judges Mark
Ciavarella and Michael Conahan from the bench for a multitude of criminal
charges involving their acceptance of $2.8 million in kickbacks for sending
juveniles to two private, for-profit detention facilities. Id.  The judges denied chil-
dren access to legal counsel in nearly 2,000 cases. Id.  “[T]he illegal and immoral
behavior of the two judges demonstrates that it is insufficient to stipulate that
juveniles are to be represented by counsel and that they will have due process
protections without also taking steps to ensure that they will be afforded those
rights.” Id.
154. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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nile lifers; these states are Michigan and Pennsylvania.155  Michi-
gan’s treatment of juvenile lifers sparked significant scrutiny of its
juvenile justice system in general, inspiring this analysis of the fail-
ure of Michigan’s current laws and actual implementation of those
laws to meet the constitutional standards for children.
A. Michigan’s Juvenile Code
The Probate Code of 1939 contains Michigan’s current laws re-
garding juvenile delinquency proceedings.156  Michigan’s juvenile
delinquency proceedings are not considered criminal proceedings—
unless waived to adult criminal court—and, as a result, do not have
to adhere to the rules of criminal procedure.157  Michigan’s circuit
courts hear delinquency cases in the family division.158
Under Michigan’s current law, a “juvenile” is anyone “less
than 17 years of age,” with no statutorily-set minimum age.159  Al-
though Michigan recently enacted “Raise-the-Age” legislation that
changes the automatic age of adult criminal culpability to 18,160 this
155. See RJ Vogt, The Biggest Access to Justice Decisions of 2018, LAW360
(Dec. 16, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://bit.ly/2BFtzk2 [https://perma.cc/4NXH-WSLR].
156. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.1–712A.32 (2018).  This section of the
Probate Code is commonly called the “Juvenile Code” in Michigan.  See the expla-
nation following the code section:  https://bit.ly/2V0mcuE [https://perma.cc/UK8E-
K9NZ].
157. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.1(2) (2018).
158. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.1(e) (2018).  The family division of the circuit
courts also handle matters such as child custody, parental rights hearings, and child
neglect cases. Michigan’s Current Court System, MICHIGAN COURTS, https://bit.ly/
2ttfmSY [https://perma.cc/9MZF-B4YZ].
159. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.1(1)(i) (2018).  Michigan is in the minority
with its current age of 17. See David Eggert, Bills to Raise Adult Criminal Age to
18 Advance in Michigan, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 30, 2016, 5:26 PM), https://
bit.ly/2XbYjlK [https://perma.cc/X6V3-VTAN] (describing how nine states permit-
ted 17-year-olds to be charged as adults in 2016); Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of
Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 17, 2017), https://bit.ly/2BunSTg [https://perma.cc/3Q76-
8ZY6] (describing how only five states had a criminal culpability age of 17 in
2017); Ben Thorp, State House Committee Passes Bills to Raise the Age Michi-
ganders Can Be Tried as Adults, MICHIGAN RADIO (Nov. 28, 2018), https://bit.ly/
2NeHKRy [https://perma.cc/58MK-DKN9] (describing how only four states had a
criminal culpability age of 17 in 2018). But see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17(2)
(2018) (granting children the right to a jury trial upon request).  One way in which
Michigan is leading the states is by permitting children the right to a trial by jury
upon request, a constitutional right specifically withheld from children. Id.; see
supra note 137 and accompanying text.  Because the Supreme Court previously
held that juvenile jury trials are inconsistent with the parens patriae doctrine, Mich-
igan’s granting that right seems to conflict with the majority of its own Juvenile
Code which largely demonstrates a parens patriae basis. See supra note 137 and
accompanying text; infra note 198 and accompanying text.
160. 2019 Mich. Pub. Acts 108 (October 31, 2019).
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law will not take effect until October 1, 2021, and will not apply
retroactively, meaning 17-year-old children in Michigan will con-
tinue to face criminal charges for the next two years.161  Addition-
ally, Michigan currently has no minority age for criminal liability, in
contrast with common law.162  Michigan’s statutory juvenile age ap-
plies to “the time of the commission of the offense”; so, even if a
child turns 17 before the hearing commences, that child must be
tried in juvenile court—barring a jurisdictional waiver by the prose-
cutor.163  If a child erroneously ends up in adult criminal court for
an offense committed while still a juvenile, the adult criminal court
must “transfer the case without delay . . . .”164
Although the automatic age of adult culpability is 17, Michigan
permits courts to jurisdictionally waive to adult criminal court chil-
dren 14 and older who commit a felony-equivalent offense.165  The
jurisdictional waiver occurs upon a prosecutor’s petition and a
judge’s approval of that petition.166  Though the child—and attor-
ney, if applicable—must receive notice of the prosecutor’s petition,
the child’s parents or guardians only receive notice if the court is
aware of their addresses.167  Before approving the waiver petition,
the juvenile court must hold a probable cause hearing and, on a
finding of probable cause, must determine whether the waiver is in
the best interests of both the child and the public.168  The other
form of jurisdictional waiver occurs when an adult criminal court
previously tried a child for a felony-equivalent offense and when
161. See id. (listing the effective date as October 1, 2021); see also Miriam
Francisco, Michigan Raises the Age of Legal Adulthood for Most Criminal Cases,
DETROIT METRO TIMES (Nov. 1, 2019, 2:13 PM), https://bit.ly/2NyjTOA [https://
perma.cc/T9VU-653D].  Because the new Raise-the-Age law does not go into ef-
fect until 2021, this Comment will consistently refer to and analyze the currently
in-force law which requires adult criminal culpability for children 17 and older.
162. See supra text accompanying note 40 (describing common law’s mini-
mum age for criminal liability).
163. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.3(1) (2018).
164. Id.
165. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(1) (2018).
166. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(1)–(2) (2018).  Prosecutors have a discre-
tionary power to petition for a jurisdictional waiver. Id.
167. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(1)–(2) (2018).  No Juvenile Code provision
requires notice to parents/guardians when a child is in custody or notice to the
child regarding why detention occurred. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.15 (2018).
168. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(3)–(4) (2018).  The juvenile court must
consider six factors in its best interest determination:  1) the “seriousness of the
alleged offense in terms of community protection,” 2) the child’s culpability, 3) the
child’s previous delinquency history, 4) the child’s previous participation in delin-
quency programs, 5) the “adequacy of the punishment or programming available,”
and 6) the child’s “dispositional options.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(4) (2018).
But the statute requires the court to give “greater weight” to the first and third
factors than to any of the others. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(3) (2018).
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the current offense is also a felony-equivalent—”once an adult, al-
ways an adult.”169  Michigan also permits law enforcement to place
children 15 and older in an adult detention facility, although those
children must stay in a cell separate from adults.170
B. Practice What You Preach
1. Jurisdictional Waiver
Michigan’s Juvenile Code permits juvenile judges to waive to
adult criminal court the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over children
aged 14 and older upon the prosecutor’s request.171  As a result,
one of the greatest inconsistencies of Michigan’s juvenile courts in-
volves the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.  The large majority of is-
sues involve the failure of trial courts to follow the “at the time of
the offense” rule.172  In some cases, the appeals courts will remand
a case to juvenile court if they discover that the offender was under
17 at the time of the offense.173  But this result is not a guarantee.174
2. Waiver of Constitutional Rights
One reason why the waiver of constitutional rights presents an
issue for children in Michigan is that delinquency proceedings have
two phases:  adjudicative and dispositional.175  The Michigan Su-
169. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(5) (2018).  Jurisdiction over a child in such
circumstances is automatically waived to adult criminal court with no hearings or
motions. Id.
170. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.16(1) (2018).
171. See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text; see also Espie v. Birkett,
No. 07-12506-BC, 2010 WL 2994010, *15 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2010).
172. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
173. See Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp. 2d 354, 362–65 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(holding that the case should have never remained in adult criminal court due to
the defendant’s being a juvenile at the time of the offense and ordering the juve-
nile court to now evaluate whether the defendant’s best interest required being
heard in the juvenile court).
174. See People v. Hana, 504 N.W.2d 166, 175 (Mich. 1993) (“[W]e are una-
ware of a constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile.”); see, e.g., In re Collins,
No. 337855, 2018 WL 987241, *4–7 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2018) (applying Hana
and holding that adjudication as an adult was permissible—even though offenses
were committed when defendant was 13–16 years old—because the defendant
“had no right to remain under the [juvenile] court’s jurisdiction and be treated as a
juvenile”).  Such a result is inconsistent with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.3(1)). But
see In re Matson, No. 332780, 2017 WL 4803572, *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017)
(court affirming the denial of waiver to adult criminal court for a defendant who
was 16 at the time of offense).
175. See In re Scruggs, 350 N.W.2d 916, 918–19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (point-
ing out the distinct categories of juvenile proceedings and holding that probation
violations do not require an adjudicative phase to determine the court’s jurisdic-
tion because the juvenile has been before the court previously).  The adjudicative
phase involves the jurisdictional determination of whether the child is even under
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preme Court has held that children are not entitled to constitutional
rights in the dispositional phase of juvenile proceedings.176  Michi-
gan courts have also refused to retroactively apply Kent and
Gault.177
Michigan courts have addressed children’s specific rights as
well as children’s “full panoply of constitutional rights,”178 holding
that 15 minutes is not sufficient for a juvenile to prepare for a court
proceeding179 and that In re Winship180 only applies to the adjudi-
cative phase and not to the dispositional phase.181  Unfortunately,
Michigan’s laws permit children as young as 11-years-old to waive
their constitutional rights without ensuring that those children fully
understand the waiver’s significance and consequences.182
3. Accessing Counsel
Although the Supreme Court held that children have a right to
counsel at “every step” of delinquency proceedings, the Court did
not specify standards for the provision of children’s counsel or for
the juvenile court’s authority. Id.  The dispositional phase follows the adjudicative
phase and involves the court’s deciding what action to take with regards to the
child. Id.
176. Hana, 504 N.W.2d at 177.
177. See, e.g., People v. Price, 179 N.W.2d 177, 178 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970);
People v. Terpening, 167 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
178. Hana, 504 N.W.2d at 177.
179. See, e.g., People v. Gillman, 248 N.W.2d 553, 553 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976)
(first citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967); then citing People v. Gulley, 238
N.W.2d 421 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); and then citing People v. Bell, 241 N.W.2d 203
(Mich. Ct. App. 1976)) (“To comply with due process requirements, the notice [of
the charge] must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so
that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded.”).  “Fifteen minutes does
not meet the test of reasonable opportunity to prepare.” Id.
180. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
181. See In re Belcher, 371 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that “the standard of proof in a juvenile probation revocation proceeding is proof
by a preponderance of the evidence” because Winship only applies to the adjudica-
tive phase and not to the dispositional, to which probation hearings belong).
182. See People v. Abraham, 599 N.W.2d 736, 739–43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)
(affirming the juvenile court’s permission for an 11-year-old boy tried in adult
criminal court after a jurisdictional waiver to additionally waive both his Miranda
rights and his right to an attorney with his mother present); see also id. at 747–48
(Doctoroff, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the child’s mental and intellectual ca-
pacity was significantly below the normal standard for his age, with some of his
skills being at either a six or eight-year-old level). Cf. People v. Williams, No.
234442, 2004 WL 1933115, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004) (permitting a 16-year-
old child to waive his Miranda rights and right to counsel with no parents or guard-
ians present and prior to his parents even being notified of his detention); id. at *2
(Cooper, J., dissenting) (“It is clear in the court rules and juvenile code that a
juvenile’s parent or guardian must be contacted immediately when he or she is
taken into custody.”).
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the qualifications of children’s counsel.183  The Court has clearly
held, however, that probation officers are not qualified to represent
a child in a delinquency proceeding.184  Michigan permits juvenile
judges to allow probation officers to act as “referees,” with one of
their duties being to “examine witnesses,” a function lawyers have
traditionally performed.185
Additionally, Michigan requires juvenile courts to “advise the
child that he or she has a right to an attorney at each stage of the
proceeding”186 but also permits a child to waive that right without
first consulting a parent or an attorney.187  A juvenile court only
appoints lawyers to represent children in specific scenarios.188  But
the Juvenile Code provides no guidance for the juvenile judge to
use in determining whether or not the child (or child’s parents) can
afford to hire an attorney.189  The Juvenile Code does not require
the court to ensure that the child understands what “right to an
attorney” actually means,190 something that the Michigan legisla-
ture should remedy due to the low percentage of children who actu-
183. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 140; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (“The
probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child.”).
185. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.10(1) (2018); cf. In re Bennett, 355 N.W.2d
277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
186. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17c(1) (2018).  The statute does not require
the juvenile courts to likewise advise the parents of the child’s right to counsel. Id.
Such a requirement is in violation of the Court’s holding in Gault. See Gault, 387
U.S. at 41 (“[T]he child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to be
represented by counsel . . . .”).  Because Michigan permits children to waive their
right to representation without first consulting their parents, informing the parent
of the right to representation is even more crucial to ensure that the parent has the
opportunity to object to the waiver (the one exception to the child’s ability to
waive). See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
187. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17c(3) (2018).
188. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17c(2) (2018).  These scenarios include:  1) if
the parents are absent (even intentionally) from the delinquency proceedings, 2) if
the parent brought the charges or was the victim, 3) if the child or child’s parents/
guardians are “financially unable to employ an attorney” (and the child does not
waive representation), 4) if the child’s parents/guardians “refuse or neglect” to hire
an attorney (and the child does not waive representation), or 5) if the court finds
that the child’s best interests or the public’s best interests demand an appointed
lawyer. Id.  Of course, if the child waives his or her right to representation, the
judge no longer has an obligation to appoint counsel in these scenarios. See id.
189. Id.
190. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17c (2018). Compare People v. Berry, 157
N.W.2d 310, 313 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (citing Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)) (“[T]he
mere showing that the accused knew of his right to counsel is not sufficient to show
a waiver of counsel . . . .”), with People v. Berry, 165 N.W.2d 896, 897 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1968) (reversing the prior holding and ruling that “the absence of an express
waiver of that right is not reversible error”).
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ally understand their rights to representation.191  As one children’s
advocate has written:  “Having a child navigate the court system
without a lawyer is like having them drive on the highway at rush
hour without ever having been behind the wheel.  It is fast, confus-
ing, and dangerous.”192
Although Governor Snyder enacted measures in 2013 to im-
prove indigent access to counsel statewide193 and most counties
have now implemented these required changes,194 the current sys-
tem is still county-controlled, meaning that each county is solely
responsible for funding and maintaining a form of indigent de-
fense.195  Additionally, the Michigan Indigent Defense Commission
has yet to conduct a report on children’s access to indigent counsel
and currently has no requirements for counties to have dedicated
juvenile public defenders.196  But another source reports from an
interview with an in-state juvenile attorney that the Michigan legal
system frequently takes advantage of children.197
191. See supra note 152.
192. Mary Ann Scali, Being David: The Future of Juvenile Defense and the
Goliath of Youth Injustice, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD
ADVOCACY IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 187, 191 (Kristin Henning et al.,
eds., 2018).
193. See About the Michigan Indigent Defense Commission, MICH. INDIGENT
DEF. COMM’N, https://bit.ly/2mGBQjD [https://perma.cc/A25X-N8W2] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019) (describing how Governor Snyder created this commission to moni-
tor and supervise the implementation of better policies regarding indigent access
to defense counsel across the state).
194. Mark McCabe, An Update on the Michigan Indigent Defense Commis-
sion Act, TRI-COUNTY TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://bit.ly/2opDN4q [https://per
ma.cc/Z35M-DNZH].
195. See The Right to Counsel and the Michigan Indigent Defense Commission
– Part II, TRI-COUNTY TIMES (July 24, 2018), https://bit.ly/2EgUZhT [https://per
ma.cc/7VK3-5JH4]; see also Emily Zantow, Michigan County Sues over New Pub-
lic Defender Rules, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://bit.ly/
2Lkf7BT [https://perma.cc/7XTC-HAV8] (describing a lawsuit filed by Oakland
County, Michigan, challenging the Commission’s new policies, which would re-
quire the County to allocate more money for their currently subpar indigent de-
fense system).
196. See Policies & Reports, MICH. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, https://bit.ly/
2DOfVMm [https://perma.cc/E9TA-VNXV] (last visited Dec. 4, 2019) (listing the
reports and data collection published by the Commission, none of which addresses
children’s access to counsel in Michigan).
197. See NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., Access Denied: A National Snapshot of
States’ Failure to Protect Children’s Right to Counsel 27 (2017), https://bit.ly/2mJi-
oTr [https://perma.cc/9TR2-7QPA] (“One attorney in Michigan reported observing
four unrepresented children waive their right to an attorney, enter guilty pleas, and
be fingerprinted in violation of state law.”).  Presumedly, these children were per-
mitted to waive their right to an attorney pursuant to the Juvenile Code. See supra
note 187 and accompanying text.
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4. Categorizing Juvenile Proceedings
Because Michigan treats juvenile matters “not as criminal pro-
ceedings” but also does not label them “civil proceedings,”198 a
question arises as to what procedural rules should apply in juvenile
courts.  The Gault Court expressly raised concerns that the lack of
procedural standards for juvenile proceedings results in the juvenile
courts’ taking advantage of the “informal” nature of the hearings
and often causing harm to the children.199  The “informal nature,”
of course, stems from the principles of the parens patriae doctrine—
principles which form the foundation for much of Michigan’s Juve-
nile Code.200
Permitting juvenile courts the latitude to determine a child’s
best interests without providing guidance for doing so can lead to
situations like the Kids for Cash scandal in Pennsylvania.201  Such
situations result from juvenile judges’ informing children that the
role of the judge is to act in the child’s best interest, leading the
child to forego legal representation that would ensure that the
child’s best interests and wishes are accurately represented in the
proceedings.202  Pennsylvania responded to its judges’ abuse of
power by amending its statutes to presume that all children are in-
digent the moment they step into juvenile court, meaning that the
198. See supra note 157 and accompanying text; see also MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 712A.17(1) (2018) (permitting Michigan’s juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings to be “informal”). But see People v. McFarlin, 208 N.W.2d 504, 513–14 (Mich.
1973) (holding that sentencing determinations for adult convictions must include
considerations of juvenile records/adjudication); In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d 742,
743–48 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that juvenile competency should be deter-
mined using the same competency standards used for adults in criminal court
proceedings).
199. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21–26 (1967) (“‘Procedure is to law what
“scientific method” is to science.’”) (quoting Henry H. Foster, Jr., Social Work, the
Law, and Social Action, 45 SOC. CASEWORK 383, 386 (1964)).
200. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2d(2) (2018) (giving courts the abil-
ity to grant a prosecutor’s petition for a jurisdictional waiver if the court finds it in
the best interest of the child); id. § 712A.4(4) (requiring the court to determine if a
jurisdictional waiver is in the child’s best interest before granting the prosecutor’s
petition); id. § 712A.11(1) (permitting the court to take action on preliminary in-
quiries into allegations against a child if the court determines it is in the child’s best
interest); id. § 712A.17(1)(b) (allowing the court to grant a continuance or ad-
journment if the court determines it is in the child’s best interests); id.
§ 712A.17c(2)(e) (requiring the court to appoint an attorney for a child if the court
finds it in the best interest of the child).
201. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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juvenile courts must automatically assign an attorney to the child as
soon as delinquency proceedings begin.203
Although Michigan’s Juvenile Code contains individual proce-
dural steps for certain sections, no statutory provision dictates the
order in which those steps should proceed.204  Additionally, the ju-
venile courts apply the existing rules inconsistently and seem to
confuse terminology on a regular basis.205
C. Recommendations
Michigan, despite beginning to consider how to improve chil-
dren’s constitutional rights,206 could take immediate remedial ac-
tion in several ways.207
1. Presumption of Indigency
The first way that Michigan can improve access to constitu-
tional rights for children is to adopt a statute similar to that adopted
203. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6337.1(b)(1) (2018).  This presumption can
only be overcome by proving to the juvenile court that the child—not the par-
ents—can afford an attorney. Id.
204. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.11 (2018) (listing the procedure for
fingerprint orders but not specifically stating that the steps must be done in any
particular order).  This Comment’s analysis focuses specifically on Michigan’s stat-
utory provisions for juvenile delinquency proceedings; however, court rules can
add important procedural details and requirements that may not be specifically
codified in the statutes.  An analysis of Michigan’s juvenile court rules is beyond
the scope of this Comment. See MICH. CT. R. 3.901–3.993 (listing Michigan’s juve-
nile court rules); see generally MICH. JUDICIAL INST., JUVENILE JUSTICE
BENCHBOOK: DELINQUENCY AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (3d ed. 2019), https://
bit.ly/2O4eYE6 [https://perma.cc/MDX6-C5XB] (providing guidance to juvenile
judges and court/legal personnel on proper implementation of statutes, rules, and
policies in Michigan’s juvenile courts).
205. See generally People v. Ristich, 426 N.W.2d 801, 802–03 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988) (pointing out that the Gault Court said that juvenile proceedings can be
considered “criminal” proceedings when dealing with the self-incrimination privi-
lege and using that to argue that juvenile proceedings can be considered “criminal”
proceedings in additional contexts); In re Belcher, 371 N.W.2d 474, 476 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985) (claiming that juvenile probationers and adult probationers are “analo-
gous” and can be held to the same burden of proof); In re Chapel, 350 N.W.2d 871,
874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing “juvenile criminal matters”).
206. See, e.g., Gov. Snyder Signs Legislation Creating Juvenile Mental Health
Courts, TV6 FOXUP (Dec. 28, 2018), https://bit.ly/2BHpmfQ [https://perma.cc/
HPK9-LUFR].  At the end of 2018, shortly before leaving office, Governor Rick
Snyder signed House Bills 5806–5808, which will create juvenile mental health
courts as another rehabilitative recourse for children charged with juvenile delin-
quency in Michigan. Id.
207. For a discussion of ways that Michigan could improve children’s access to
justice and constitutional protections through a substantive due process frame-
work, see generally Tiffani N. Darden, Constitutionally Different: A Child’s Right
to Substantive Due Process, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 211 (2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK206.txt unknown Seq: 30 11-FEB-20 11:16
528 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:499
in Pennsylvania,208 which presumes that every child who enters the
juvenile court is indigent and needs publicly-funded counsel.  Such
a change would only work, though, if the Michigan Indigent De-
fense Commission were to require the county-based defender orga-
nizations to employ dedicated juvenile public defenders to fill the
need that such a statute would create.209  The Commission should
also conduct its own study of juvenile courts statewide to defini-
tively determine just how widespread the lack of juvenile access to
counsel truly is.210
2. Age Adjustments
The second way that Michigan can improve its children’s access
to constitutional rights is to address the recent Raise-the-Age legis-
lation’s deferred effective date211 and to set a minimum age for
criminal culpability.212  Such changes could effectively ensure that
only children who know the difference between right and wrong are
legally punished for offenses and that children who are still in high
school are not automatically sent to the adult criminal justice sys-
tem for offenses that can be handled in the juvenile courts.
Because Michigan has no minimum age for criminal culpabil-
ity, prosecutors were able to pursue charges against a 10-year-old
child in Detroit for having a gun in his backpack at school, and the
juvenile court could require a $5,000 personal bond against the
child.213  Likewise, Michigan’s current laws require 17-year-old chil-
dren, many of whom are still in high school, to automatically be
charged as adult criminals; the recently-passed legislation to rem-
edy that problem will not go into effect for 2 years, during which
time 17-year-olds will continue to face automatic criminal
culpability.214
208. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
213. See Benjamin Raven, Ten-Year-Old Michigan Boy Charged After Bring-
ing Loaded Gun to School, MLIVE (Dec. 6, 2018), https://bit.ly/2Ej2rcx [https://per
ma.cc/4DRC-5GZT].  The school later admitted that the “loaded gun” had one
bullet in the chamber but no additional ammunition. See 10-Year-Old Boy
Charged for Bringing Loaded Gun into Detroit School, WXYZ DETROIT (Dec. 6,
2018), https://bit.ly/2V5WoNI [https://perma.cc/CY3X-TQZA].
214. See Interview with Zachary*, Michigan resident (Dec. 28, 2018).  *At
Zachary’s request, I have withheld his last name for privacy purposes.  Zachary, at
the age of 17, was alleged to have engaged in several counts of sexual misconduct
with his previous girlfriend and was facing charges in adult criminal court. Id.  The
court assigned Zachary, who was a senior in high school and estranged from his
mother (with no clear alternative guardian), a public defender with whom Zachary
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3. No Blanket Jurisdictional Waivers
The third way that Michigan can improve its children’s access
to constitutional rights is to create more rigorous requirements for
jurisdictional waivers to adult criminal courts215 and to consistently
follow the existing laws regarding jurisdictional waiver.216
Perfunctorily waiving children 14 and over to adult criminal
court defeats the very purpose of Michigan’s Juvenile Code.217  A
Michigan Supreme Court judge emphatically expressed his belief
that the waiver concept is incompatible with the rehabilitative na-
ture of the juvenile court.218  The constant jurisdictional waiver has
also resulted in countless children being housed with adult
criminals, violating Michigan’s own Juvenile Code.219  These types
of waivers can also have far-reaching and unexpected implications
for and consequences on other aspects of children’s lives.  Besides
the obvious impact of adult criminal convictions on a child’s crimi-
nal record (convictions that are extremely difficult to expunge in
comparison to juvenile delinquency adjudications),220 a non-citizen
had to initiate contact. Id.  Zachary’s public defender, a private attorney receiving
a government fee for his work on this case, encouraged Zachary to take a plea deal
(plead guilty to a felony, serve one year in jail, and be placed on the sex offender’s
registry). Id.  Zachary, although innocent, had no one else to consult and accepted
this plea deal. Id.  Shortly after Zachary finished his jail time, the alleged victim
recanted to the prosecutor, and the judge rescinded the requirement for Zachary
to register as a sex offender. Id.  The felony conviction remains on Zachary’s re-
cord, however, and has presented numerous problems as he strives to provide for
his wife and three children. Id.  Although he has a pardon letter from the gover-
nor, Zachary must carry that letter with him to counteract the false conviction still
on his record. Id.
215. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text.
217. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.1(3) (2018) (“This chapter shall be liber-
ally construed so that each juvenile coming within the court’s jurisdiction receives
the care, guidance, and control, preferably in his or her own home, conducive to
the juvenile’s welfare and the best interest of the state.”).
218. See People v. Hana, 504 N.W.2d 166, 178–79 (Mich. 1993) (Cavanagh,
C.J., dissenting) (“In reality, the decision to waive juvenile court jurisdiction is not
a decision to rehabilitate, but, rather, a decision to punish the juvenile upon
conviction.”).
219. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.  Although Michigan statutes
require children to be kept separate from adult prisoners, the Sixth Circuit recently
heard an appeal on a lawsuit that alleges that Michigan has housed 500 children in
close quarters with adult prisoners in Michigan correctional facilities, resulting in
many of these children’s suffering sexual abuse including rape. See generally Doe
v. Snyder, 945 F.3d 951 (6th Cir. December 18, 2019); Kevin Koeninger, Juveniles
Housed with Adults Bring Claims to Sixth Circuit, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV.
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://bit.ly/2NdqV9P [https://perma.cc/426V-R675].
220. See, e.g., “Expunging Juvenile Records,” Expungement, Wrongful Con-
viction, CQEs and CAEs in Ohio, FRANKLIN COUNTY LAW LIBRARY, https://bit.ly/
34M8tww [https://perma.cc/S8K5-GBNZ] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
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child’s being waived to adult criminal court can potentially result in
that child’s deportation because adult convictions are criminal and
trigger mandatory deportation statutes.221
4. Consistent Categorization of Juvenile Proceedings
The final way that Michigan can improve its children’s access
to constitutional rights is to ensure that juvenile proceedings are
consistently categorized as either civil (according to the current
statute) or criminal (as court opinions often reference) but not
both.222  Juvenile judges who lived through the changes of the Gault
case find the recent changes to juvenile justice—to treat children
more like adult criminals than like children in need of parens pa-
triae guidance—to be disturbing.223
Because Michigan’s juvenile courts are inconsistent in how
they treat children (sometimes like adult criminals and sometimes
as children in need of guidance),224 children in Michigan cannot
know for sure where they stand when they enter a juvenile court-
room.  Michigan needs to either continue to follow its own Juvenile
Code and treat children in the manner of parens patriae through
civil proceedings225 or to follow the recent trend of its juvenile
judges and shift towards treating all offenders—even children—in
the same manner through criminal proceedings.226  Despite the ad-
ditional constitutional rights that criminal categorization would
guarantee, civil categorization could provide other protections.227
IV. CONCLUSION
The treatment of children in U.S. courts has undergone a myr-
iad of changes in the last 100 years:  although common-law courts
originally dealt with child offenders in the same manner as adult
criminals, the 20th century saw the creation of unique juvenile
221. See generally In re Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362 (B.I.A. Sept.
12, 2000) (stating that juvenile delinquency adjudications do not trigger mandatory
deportation statutes because delinquency proceedings are civil rather than
criminal).
222. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
223. See Douglas Levy, A Sidebar with . . . Judge Frank D. Willis, MICH. LAW-
YERS WEEKLY (Mar. 9, 2015), https://bit.ly/2tqMoD7 [https://perma.cc/KZ3G-
GS33].  Judge Willis, a retired juvenile court judge, expressed his concern that the
then-recent decision to permit juveniles access to the incompetency defense and to
competency hearings reflects a dangerous trend to treat children as adults rather
than “in the patriarch theory.” Id.
224. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.
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courts that used the parens patriae doctrine to treat child offenders
as delinquent youth in need of guidance from parental authority
figures.  As the 21st century began, though, juvenile courts across
the country followed the Supreme Court’s lead by providing consti-
tutional protections to children.
This shift originated from the Supreme Court’s realization that
children need the protection that constitutional rights provide and
cannot rely on imperfect, human judges to consistently provide that
protection.  Michigan, though, has yet to emerge from this transi-
tion and to fully implement the necessary protections for its chil-
dren.  Michigan’s Juvenile Code, clearly created based on a parens
patriae mentality, is at conflict with the practices used in many of
Michigan’s juvenile courts.
To begin taking steps towards the protection of its children,
Michigan needs to implement some legal and procedural changes:
amend its current statutes regarding child indigent defense to create
a presumption of indigency when a child steps into the juvenile
court; consider eliminating the child’s ability to waive the right to
counsel; find a way to remedy the gap between the passage and
implementation of the recently-enacted Raise-the-Age legislation;
start a discussion about the need for a minimum age of criminal
liability; increase the standards and requirements for jurisdictional
waivers of children into adult criminal court; and consistently cate-
gorize juvenile court proceedings as either civil or criminal in
nature.
Children’s constitutional rights are critical to their safety and
protection, as exemplified by what happened to Brock when the
police completely disregarded his constitutional rights.  As the Kids
for Cash scandal demonstrated, juvenile court judges cannot always
be relied upon to act in a child’s best interests; thus, it is critical that
Michigan ensures that its juvenile courts preserve and respect the
constitutional rights of children at all stages of delinquency
proceedings.
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